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Summary
The panzootic caused by A/goose/Guangdong/1/96-lineage highly pathogenic avian
influenza (HPAI) A(H5) viruses has occurred in multiple waves since 1996. From 2013
onwards, clade 2.3.4.4 viruses of subtypes A(H5N2), A(H5N6), and A(H5N8) emerged to
cause panzootic waves of unprecedented magnitude among avian species accompanied
by severe losses to the poultry industry around the world. Clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses
have expanded in distinct geographical and evolutionary pathways likely via long distance
migratory bird dispersal onto several continents and by poultry trade among neighboring
countries. Coupled with regional circulation, the viruses have evolved further by
reassorting with local viruses. As of February 2019, there have been 23 cases of humans
infected with clade 2.3.4.4 H5N6 viruses, 16 (70%) of which had fatal outcomes. To date,
no HPAI A(H5) virus has caused sustainable human-to-human transmission. However,
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due to the lack of population immunity in humans and ongoing evolution of the virus,
there is a continuing risk that clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses could cause an influenza pan-
demic if the ability to transmit efficiently among humans was gained. Therefore, multi-
sectoral collaborations among the animal, environmental, and public health sectors are
essential to conduct risk assessments and develop countermeasures to prevent disease
and to control spread. In this article, we describe an assessment of the likelihood of clade
2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses gaining human-to-human transmissibility and impact on human
health should such human-to-human transmission occur. This structured analysis
assessed properties of the virus, attributes of the human population, and ecology and
epidemiology of these viruses in animal hosts.
K E YWORD S
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Influenza A viruses infect a wide spectrum of animal species preclud-
ing global eradication. Genetically diverse viruses circulate among wild
aquatic birds, which are considered to be their natural reservoir and
experience no or only mild signs of disease when infected. In birds,
the viruses typically replicate in the intestinal and respiratory tracts
and are shed in the environment where other hosts become infected.
Viruses from the aquatic wild bird reservoir may infect other avian
species including terrestrial poultry, such as chickens and quail, and
domesticated waterfowl, such as ducks and geese. Following circula-
tion in these densely populated host species, avian influenza viruses
may then transmit to mammalian hosts, including humans, pigs,
horses, dogs, and marine mammals.1
Globalization and industrialization over the past decades have con-
tributed to the emergence of novel influenza viruses that threaten animal
and human health. Once they emerge and become transmissible between
humans, influenza viruses can rapidly spread worldwide. Current vaccines
which take 6 months to distribute from strain selection in the current
influenza manufacturing cycle are unlikely to be available to contain the
first wave of human infections of a pandemic. Therefore, it is strategically
important to risk-assess and prioritize animal influenza viruses with pan-
demic potential to initiate possible responses, including preparatory devel-
opment of vaccines, and antiviral drug efficacy testing. The World Health
Organization (WHO) Global Influenza Programme (GIP) developed a Tool
for Influenza Pandemic Risk Assessment (TIPRA)2 based on the Influenza
Risk Assessment Tool (IRAT)3 developed by the WHO Collaborating Cen-
tre at the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) and in consultation with experts in the WHO Global Influenza Sur-
veillance and Response System (GISRS) and other institutions and acade-
mia. Since TIPRA was launched in 2016, it has provided a framework for
influenza A virus risk assessment through a standardized approach for
evaluating the likelihood of pandemic emergence and associated impact
of a novel virus. In this risk assessment process, the WHO, the World
Organization for Animal Health (OIE), and the Food and Agriculture Orga-
nization (FAO) tripartite collaboration brings together multiple
stakeholders worldwide, including public and animal health practitioners
and influenza researchers from different sectors within the “One Health”
concept, and strengthens interdisciplinary global collaboration.4
Because the emergence of the highly pathogenic avian influenza
(HPAI) A(H5) viruses of the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 (gs/GD) hemag-
glutinin (HA) lineage, there have been 883 officially reported human
infections by viruses of this lineage: 860 by A(H5N1) and 23 by A(H5N6)
viruses.5 The dominant HA clades of H5 viruses vary temporally and spa-
tially, with some achieving a wide geographical spread. Infections among
humans and other mammals,6–8 however, have been restricted to the ini-
tial index cases or a small number of close contacts. Because HPAI A(H5)
viruses bearing an HA of clade 2.3.4 were identified in China in 2008,
they have evolved into further subgroups including clade 2.3.4.49 and
have acquired various neuraminidase subtypes, including N1, N2, N5,
N6, and N8, by reassortment with other avian influenza viruses enzootic
in different regions. In addition, the geographic spread of clade 2.3.4.4
A(H5) viruses has been unprecedented, resulting in regional epizootics in
poultry, increasing the opportunities for avian-to-human transmission.
Although human-to-human transmission of clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses
has not been observed to date, the pandemic potential of these viruses
remains unpredictable. Given the lack of population immunity to A(H5)
subtype viruses, the ongoing evolution of clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses,
and sporadic human infections, the pandemic potential of these viruses
cannot be ignored. In this review, we focus on the three clade 2.3.4.4
subtypes, A(H5N2), A(H5N6), and A(H5N8), that have the greatest fre-
quency of global detections, and describe their biological features and
the use of TIPRA in risk asessment.2
2 | GLOBAL SPREAD OF HPAI CLADE
2.3.4.4 A(H5) VIRUSES
The clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5N8) viruses were first reported in migratory
ducks and curlews in Shanghai, China in 2013 by retrospective
surveillance,10 followed by outbreaks in the Republic of Korea
(ROK) in January of 2014.11–14 During the outbreaks in ROK, two
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distinct genetic groups were identified: a group represented by
A/broiler duck/Korea/Buan2/2014 and the WHO candidate vaccin
e virus (CVV) recommended by WHO,15 A/gyrfalcon/Washington
/41088-6/2014 (referred to as “group A” by Lee et al16), and another
group represented by A/breeder duck/Korea/Gochang1/201414 and the
CVV, A/Fujian-Sanyuan/21099/2017 (referred to as “group B” by Lee
et al16) (Figure 1a). A group of viruses represented by A/gyrfalcon/-
Washington/41088-6/2014 (hereby A/gyrfalcon/Washington
/41088-6/2014 group) likely spread eastwards, to North America via
Beringia by long-distance migratory birds17–22 (Figure 1b). In November
2014, these viruses reassorted with avian influenza viruses from North
American wild birds generating an A(H5N2) virus that was the cause of
an outbreak in poultry farms in British Columbia.23 From March through
mid-June of 2015, HPAI A(H5N2) viruses caused widespread outbreaks
in commercial poultry flocks mainly in the Pacific, Western, and North
Central regions of the United States.24 The spread of the virus in the Un
ited States was accompanied by multiple reassortment events between
HPAI A(H5) viruses and low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) viruses
from wild and domestic birds.25 The United States Department of Agri-
culture (USDA) documented that during the outbreaks 50.4 million birds
died or were culled in the 15 affected states.17,20,26–28 After the initial
wave of outbreaks in North America, detections of the HPAI A(H5) virus
declined; it has not been detected in poultry since June 16, 2015 or in
wild birds since December 16, 2016 in North America25,29,30 (Supplemen
tary Table 1). In parallel with the spread of clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5N8) viruses
to North America, related A/gyrfalcon/Washington/41088-6/2014--
group viruses had also moved into Europe and were widespread by the
end of 2014.31–35 Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that sporadic outbreaks
of A/gyrfalcon/Washington/41088-6/2014-group A(H5N2) and
A(H5N8) viruses continue to be detected among poultry with the latest
outbreak caused by A(H5N2) viruses in a chicken farm in April 2019.36
Although the A/gyrfalcon/Washington/41088-6/2014-group
viruses were disseminated from Asia to other continents, a group of
viruses represented by A/Fujian-Sanyuan/21099/2017 (hereby
A/Fujian-Sanyuan/21099/2017 group) did not initially appear to
spread outside Asia.37 However, this changed in mid-2016 when
these A(H5N8) viruses were detected in wild birds at Tyva Republic
near Uvs-Nuur Lake in Russian Federation38–40 and Qinghai Lake in
China.41 This group subsequently spread, presumably by wild birds, to
many other countries19,22,42 in Africa,43–45 Asia,46–50 Europe,51–57
and the Middle East58–62 (Figure 1b). As was seen with the earlier
spread of A(H5N8) viruses in North America, multiple reassortment
events with local wild bird viruses occurred generating additional
NA subtypes.63,64 According to the OIE, between mid-2016 and
October 2018, 51 countries in Africa, Asia, and Europe reported
clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5N8) viruses in either poultry or wild birds.65
From 2017-2018, A(H5N6) viruses with HA gene of the A/Fujian-
Sanyuan/21099/2017 group were isolated from birds in the
Netherlands,66 the United Kingdom,67 Germany, Greece, Republic
of Georgia, and Denmark and Eastern Asian countries48,68,69
(Supplementary Table 1).
In contrast to the A/gyrfalcon/Washington/41088-6/2014-group
and A/Fujian-Sanyuan/21099/2017-group viruses, which were
characterized by global spread, other genetic groups of clade 2.3.4.4
A(H5) viruses have to date remained more limited in geographic range.
One group represented by the WHO CVVs, A/Hubei/29578/2016,
A/chicken/Vietnam/NCVD-15A59/2015, and A/duck/Hyogo/1/2016
(referred to as “group C” by Lee et al16 and hereby
A/Hubei/29578/2016 group), is comprised mainly A(H5N6) viruses
that have been maintained among avian species since 2013 in
China,70,71 Japan,72–74 Lao People's Democratic Republic,75 ROK,76
and Vietnam77 (Figure 1a and b). The viral ancestors to several groups
of clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses described herein are represented by the
WHO CVV, A/Sichuan/26221/2014 (referred to as “group D” by Lee
et al16 and hereby A/Sichuan/26221/2014 group). This group of pri-
marily A(H5N6) viruses were identified in China as early as 2010,78–81
but have not been detected since 2015.
3 | INFECTIONS IN MAMMALS AND IN
ANIMAL MODELS
Clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5N2), A(H5N6), and A(H5N8) with genetic groups
have been identified from both poultry and wild birds.82,83 Detections
of A(H5N6) viruses in cats and pigs have been reported6–8; at least
two of these had epidemiological links with infected poultry or an
infected human.6,7 In one instance, an A(H5N6) virus was detected
from a dead cat found in proximity to the residence of a patient
infected with an A/Sichuan/26221/2014-group A(H5N6) virus in
Sichuan province, China.6 An A(H5N6) virus was also isolated from a
nasal swab taken from a pig in Guangdong province, China, in 2014
and was found to be closely related to A(H5N6) viruses isolated from
ducks in the area at the same time.7 In addition, an A(H5N6) virus iso-
lated from a cat carcass in Zhejiang province, China, in 2016 was
found to share three gene segments, HA, NA, and PA, with
A/Hubei/29578/2016-group A(H5N6) viruses co-circulating in east-
ern and southern China in 2013-2016; the other five genes were
closely related to A(H9N2) and A(H7N9) viruses.8 In contrast to the
A(H5N6) viruses, natural infections of mammalian species by clade
2.3.4.4 A(H5N2) and A(H5N8) viruses have not yet been detected.
Several studies have documented the enhanced virulence of
some clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses in experimentally infected
mammals.84–87 An A(H5N6) virus isolated from a patient who had
underlying medical conditions and recovered from severe pneumonia,
A/Guangzhou/39715/2014, with the E627K substitution in the PB2
protein, produced severe pneumonia in ferrets inoculated intra-
tracheally with 106 TCID50 of the virus.
86 However, in several reports,
clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses showed mild disease with no mortality in
experimentally inoculated ferrets.88–91 Two studies showed that the
pathogenicity of clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5N8) viruses in ferrets were milder
than control HPAI A(H5N1) viruses.91,92 Although the ferret model
has an advantage of displaying similar clinical manifestation of influ-
enza virus infection to those of humans, there are limited experimen-
tal data available due to disadvantages such as high cost and laborious
handling. Although susceptibility to influenza virus infection of mice
varies with their genetic background and its clinical manifestations are
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dissimilar to those of typical influenza virus infection of humans, mice
are an established model to assess the pathogenicity of influenza
virus. An A(H5N8) A/Fujian-Sanyuan/21099/2017-group virus cau-
sed 100% mortality in mice when intra-nasally inoculated at a dose of
106.0 EID50, despite the lack of the well characterized mammalian
pathogenicity markers PB2 627K and 701N.87 Although some clade
2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses can cause severe disease in experimentally
infected mammals, several studies showed considerable variation in
F IGURE 1 (a) Geographical regions in the world that
confirmed to have isolated clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses
from animals; mammals and avian species. Geographical
regions colored in brown, Africa; green, Asia; pink,
Europe; orange, Middle East; and blue, North and South
America. (b) Phylogenetic relationships of HA genes of
A(H5) highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses. Of 3685
HPAI A(H5) viruses isolated from animals including
mammals and avian species available in Global Initiative
on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID) and GenBank
between 2013 and 2018, arbitrarily chosen 1134 strains
were analyzed. The open reading frame of HA genes
A(H5) virus was used for phylogenetic analysis. Multiple
sequence alignment of A(H5) viruses was performed
together with alignment of genetic sequence data (GSD)
downloaded from GISAID using BioEdit 7.2. A maximum-
likelihood tree using the 1134 A(H5) HA genes and
242 representative A(H5) HA genes135 rooted to
A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 was constructed for MEGA
7 with 1000 replicate
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pathogenicity.93–95 One A/Hubei/29578/2016-group A(H5N6) virus
showed enhanced virulence in mice with a mortality rate of 80%,
whereas mice infected with three other viruses of the same subtype
and group survived the 14-day observation period.94 Similarly, Zhao
et al. showed that three A(H5N6) viruses exhibited different pathoge-
nicity in mice following intra-nasal inoculation with 106 EID50 of virus;
two viruses caused 60% mortality, whereas the other was not lethal.95
Dogs intra-nasally inoculated with 106 EID50 of an A(H5N6) virus
shed virus for 7 days with no mortality, similar to what was observed
with a control HPAI A(H5N1) virus.96 However, the extent to which
common laboratory mammalian models can predict the pathogenicity
of influenza viruses in humans or even the replication in human cells
remains unclear. For example, Grund et al. demonstrated that a
A/Fujian-Sanyuan/21099/2017-group A(H5N8) virus was highly
pathogenic for mice without prior adaptation; however, the same
virus replicated poorly in human lung explants.97
4 | HUMAN INFECTIONS WITH CLADE
2.3.4.4 A(H5N6) VIRUS
The first human infection caused by a clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5N6) virus
was reported by China in April 2014.98–102 As of February 2019, a
total of 23 human infections with A(H5N6) viruses were reported
to WHO, 16 (70%) of which had fatal outcomes. Eighteen of the
total human infections (78%) were reported in 2014-2016, one in
2017, and four in 2018. Most infections occurred in the southern
China provinces. According to the self-reported exposure history of
people infected with HPAI A(H5N6) virus, 19 of 23 had exposure to
poultry, which therefore suggested that contact with poultry or
contaminated poultry market environments was the source of
infection.100,103–108 The hospitalized patients initially showed
influenza-like symptoms including fever, sore throat, headache,
chills, cough, and myalgia, then developed into shortness of breath
due to severe pneumonia and progressed to acute respiratory dis-
tress syndrome (ARDS) and multiple organ failure (MOF) in the
deceased patients.99–101,103–110 Bi et al. indicated that A(H5N6)
patients were observed to have significantly higher levels of 11 cyto-
kines and 5 chemokines among the 48 markers tested, compared to
individuals with A(H7N9) or A(H1N1)pdm09 infections.103 No
human infections with A(H5N2) or A(H5N8) viruses have been
reported to date.
Although virologic surveillance is typically not designed to detect
cases that are not severe such as influenza-like illness, serologic stud-
ies can estimate the frequencies of less severe and mild infections.
Two studies have looked for evidence of seroconversion to clade
2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses in poultry farmers.111,112 In a study involving
523 farmers exposed to poultry during the 2016-2017 ROK A(H5N6)
outbreaks, no evidence for infection was found when using a micro-
neutralization assay to detect seropositivity.111 In another study,
61 of 760 sera from poultry farmers in the Russian Federation had
hemagglutination inhibition titers greater than 20 against an A(H5N8)
virus.112 In terms of preexisiting antibodies to A(H5) viruses in the
general population, Freidl et al. were unable to detect reactivity
against A(H5N1) antigens both before and after the A(H1N1)pdm09
pandemic in 6896 blood samples collected from 11 countries in Asia,
Europe, and North America as tested with an HA protein microar-
ray.113 Zhao et al. also showed that no neutralizing antibody against
the A(H5N1) virus, A/Vietnam/1194/2004, was detected among
35 healthy volunteers in China.114 These data support the premise
that there is a lack of immunity in the general population, which con-
stitutes a significant risk, should the clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) virus gain effi-
cient human-to-human transmissibility.
The 22 A(H5N6) viruses from human cases for which genetic
sequence data (GSD) are available in the EpiFlu database of GISAID were
all classified as clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses. Subgroups within clade
2.3.4.4 to which the human viruses belong have changed over time: a
virus collected in February 2014 belonged to the
A/Sichuan/26221/2014-like group, 20 viruses collected between April
2014 and November 2017 belonged to the A/Hubei/29578/2016
group, and a virus in the A/Fujian-Sanyuan/21099/2017 group was
detected in 2017 (Table 1). GSD of the most recent viruses are not yet
available. With the exception of the 2014 virus, of available data so far,
all human viruses had a NA stalk deletion at amino acid positions 58-68,
which is known to be an adaptation to terrestrial poultry and has been
associated with enhanced virulence in mice presumably by altering the
HA-NA balance of the virus. Although all human infections were with
A(H5N6) viruses, a number of different genotypes were involved con-
taining a variety of internal genes originating from A(H5N1) and
A(H9N2) viruses circulating in poultry, as well as A(H3) viruses circulating
in ducks.98,102,104,115 Multiple amino acid substitutions associated with
mammalian adaptation were found in viral proteins, particularly in inter-
nal proteins. Amino acid substitutions that confer oseltamivir resistance
(H274Y and N294S by N2 numbering) were not found in the human
A(H5N6) virus isolates, consistent with their low frequency in avian ori-
gin viruses. Some strains of A(H5N6) from human cases did, however,
have the M2 S31N mutation associated with adamantine resistance.
5 | RECEPTOR BINDING PROPERTIES OF
CLADE 2.3.4.4 A(H5) VIRUSES
The specificity of the viral HA for the host cell receptor molecule reg-
ulates virus entry into cells. Human influenza A viruses preferentially
bind to receptors with sialic acid linked to galactose by an α2,6 linkage
(Sia-α2,6Gal), which is abundantly displayed in the upper respiratory
tract of humans.116 In contrast, most avian influenza A viruses have a
binding preference for receptors with Sia-α2,3Gal, which is sparse in
the upper respiratory tract of humans, but abundant in the intestinal
mucosa of birds.116 The difference in receptor binding preference is
considered to be one of the main reasons why avian viruses rarely
infect and transmit poorly in humans and human influenza viruses do
not replicate well in birds.
Among 1994 clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses isolated between
January 2013 and October 2018 with GSD available in the EpiFlu
database of GISAID, 1988 (99.7%) had an HA-160A (H3 numbering)
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amino acid residue and 1295 (64.8%) had HA-227R amino acid resi-
due (Supplementary Table 2). The HA-160A substitution results in
lack of a glycosylation motif in combination with residues 158-160 of
HA1, which facilitate airborne transmission in ferrets (HA-N158D by
Imai et al. and HA-T160A by Herfst et al. in H3 numbering).117–119
Amino acid residues at positions 222 and 227 play important roles in
binding sialyl Lewis X (30SLeX), which is abundant on the epithelial
cells of the chicken trachea.120 Overall, there was no notable differ-
ence in the GSD of the HA receptor binding site among A(H5N2),
A(H5N6), and A(H5N8) viruses despite only A(H5N6) viruses being
found in human infections (Supplementary Table 2). Among the stud-
ies that examined receptor binding specificity of clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5)
viruses, 13 isolates including two A(H5N2), seven A(H5N6), and four
A(H5N8) viruses had receptor binding specificity for both Sia-α2,6Gal
and Sia-α2,3Gal (Table 2). In general, the viruses that exhibited affinity
for human-type receptors also maintained a high affinity for avian-
type receptors. It is thought that a human transmissible virus could
only have low affinity for the avian-type receptor. Most of the
13 viruses with dual receptor specificity had HA amino acids 128P,
137A, and 160A, but not all viruses possessing these amino acids had
dual-receptor specificity (Table 2). Additional amino acid substitutions
needed to cross the species barrier likely vary with the makeup of the
HA gene. Biophysical assays such as glycan arrays, solid-phase binding
assays, and HA assays using sialidase-treated red blood cells have
been mainstream methods to analyze the receptor binding specificity
of influenza viruses. Virus tropism in ex vivo cultures of human bron-
chus has also been suggested to be an alternative experimental model
to assess receptor binding of animal viruses to the human respiratory
tract.121 Only a few glycans present in glycan arrays are present on
the human respiratory tract.122 Similarly, A/environment/Korea/
W541/2016 (H5N6), although not possessing known molecular
markers associated with mammalian adaptation (namely PB2 627K,
271A, 590S, 591R, 147T, 339T, or 588T), replicated well in human
NHBE cells and ex-vivo lung tissues.84 Moreover, A/Guang-
zhou/39715/2014 A(H5N6), which was shown to predominantly bind
to Sia-α2,3 Gal and possessed PB2 627K, grew comparably to an
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in ex vivo human bronchus and lung culture123
(Table 2). A/Fujian-Sanyuan/21099/2017-like A(H5N8) viruses, in
contrast, replicated poorly in ex vivo cultures of human lung
explants.97
6 | ASSESSMENT OF THE
TRANSMISSIBILITY OF THE CLADE 2.3.4.4
A(H5) VIRUSES IN ANIMAL MODELS
Several studies have been conducted to assess the transmissibility of
the clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses. These included assessing direct con-
tact and respiratory droplet transmission using multiple animal
models, namely ferrets, pigs, guinea pigs, and
dogs84,86,88–92,95–97,124,125 (Table 3). Five clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses,
including one of which preferentially bound to Sia-α2,3 Gal84 and one
of which showed dual-receptor specificity,124 were transmitted via
direct contact in guinea pig or ferret models84,95,124,125 (Table 3). An
A(H5N6) virus A/environment/Korea/W541/2016, which grew well
in human cells despite having strong affinity to avian-type receptors,
transmitted to two of three ferrets co-housed with infected animals.84
The high proliferation competency of this virus strain in human NHBE
cells and ex vivo lung tissues might have facilitated its transmission
via direct contact. Herft et al. demonstrated that the HA of A/Guang-
zhou/39715/2014 A(H5N6) showed less acid stability than an
A/Indonesia/5/2005 A(H5N1) virus adapted for airborne-transmission
between ferrets and an H3N2 seasonal influenza virus, A/Nether-
lands/213/2003.86 Correspondingly, A/Guangzhou/39715/2014
A(H5N6), which exclusively bound to Sia-α2,3 Gal, did not transmit
among ferrets via respiratory droplets. The individual infected with
this A(H5N6) virus had underlying disease and exposure to infected
poultry which might have promoted virus replication competency in
human cells and infection. Airborne or respiratory droplet transmis-
sion of clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5N2), A(H5N6), and A(H5N8) viruses has not
been demonstrated in any animal model examined, which is consistent
with the epidemiology of the virus in humans (showing no evidence of
human-to-human spread) (Table 3).
Receptor binding affinity is a prerequisite, but insufficient alone
to promote airborne transmission of A(H5) avian viruses. Several stud-
ies have shown that compensatory mutations in HA are required to
counteract the HA instability caused by human-type receptor-binding
mutations.117,118,126 Additional mutations are also involved to
increase viral proliferation and transcription.117,119 Identified compen-
satory mutations to enhance thermostability and facilitate membrane
fusion at a lower pH are located in both the globular head and stalk
regions of the HA.119,127 Chen et al. suggested that optimization of
HA, NA, and internal genes is a requirement for efficient transmis-
sion.128 They demonstrated that an A(H5N1) reassortant virus with
Sia-α2,6 Gal preferential binding (amino acid substitutions Q196R,
Q226L, G228S) coupled with the NA of a human seasonal A(H3N2)
virus was transmitted via respiratory droplets among ferrets, whereas
the same virus combined with the NA of the avian A(H5N1) virus was
not transmitted.128 Furthermore, internal genes also contribute
undetermined functions that lead to efficient transmission. Zhang
et al. demonstrated that the NS gene of the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus
enabled a reassorted A(H5N1) virus to efficiently transmit among
guinea pigs via respiratory droplets but the avian NS gene did not.126
A scenario in which a clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) virus reassorts with a human
seasonal influenza virus may facilitate transmission among mammals,
although further adaptations would likely be needed for optimal
spread. Taken all together, and reassuringly, clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5N2),
A(H5N6), and A(H5N8) viruses have so far shown limited ability to
infect and transmit efficiently in mammalian species.
7 | DISCUSSION
The experimental data generated to date has not detected differences
in receptor binding specificity and transmission capability among
mammals between clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5N2), A(H5N6), and A(H5N8)
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viruses despite that only the A(H5N6) subtype of the clade 2.3.4.4
A(H5) viruses among three has been found in humans. Dual-receptor
binding specificity, viruses that show equal binding in vitro to both
human and avian receptor analogues, has been observed in viruses of
all three subtypes, and some of the viruses were transmitted via direct
contact among ferrets or guinea pigs. However, no studies have iden-
tified receptor binding profiles showing a preference for binding to
human receptor analogues, or animal model transmission patterns,
showing spread via the aerosol route, consistent with a virus adapted
to transmit in humans. What is less clear is precisely which molecular
changes would lead to such adaptation.
A/Hubei/29578/2016-group clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses, which
are primarily A(H5N6) viruses, have been confined to Asia. In contrast,
A/gyrfalcon/Washington/41088-6/2014-group A(H5N2) and
A(H5N8) viruses and A/Fujian-Sanyuan/21099/2017-group A(H5N8)
viruses spread from Asia to North America, Europe, the Middle East,
and the African continent and gave rise to numerous outbreaks
among poultry and wild birds following reassortment with viruses
from local avian species. Despite significant exposure to A(H5N2),
A(H5N6) or A(H5N8) infected poultry, so far only the A(H5N6) sub-
type viruses have caused human infection. What then differentiates
the zoonotic potential of the A(H5N6) viruses from that of the other
two subtypes?
Several possible reasons can be considered here. First, biosecurity
systems vary across countries. A/Fujian-Sanyuan/21099/2017-group
A(H5N8) and A/gyrfalcon/Washington/41088-6/2014-group
A(H5N2) and A(H5N8) viruses were detected in poultry in multiple
places in the United States and in Europe, resulting in severe impacts
on the poultry industries. The majority of affected countries executed
a systematic stamping-out strategy.129 If outbreaks of the same mag-
nitude as the A(H5N2) outbreaks in the United States during
2014-2015 had happened in regions where biosecurity and precau-
tionary strategies were less stringent, the risks of human infection
might have been higher. Perhaps more importantly, live poultry mar-
kets, which are a significant source of human exposure in Asia, are
rare in the United States and Europe, limiting highly contaminated
environments inhabited by birds with humans in close contact. Sec-
ond, more controversially, inadequate or improper vaccination in poul-
try can also complicate eradication of HPAI. Between 2002 and 2010,
15 countries implemented vaccination in poultry against HPAI
A(H5N1) or A(H7) avian influenza viruses as food security and animal
health measures within a long-term control program.130 In one exam-
ple, when vaccines were antigenically similar with the targeted
A(H5N1) viruses and were properly applied with production of a
protective immune response in ≥60% of the poultry population, a
reduction in virus infection and transmission was achieved and out-
breaks declined.131 When a protective immune response was pro-
duced in <60% of the poultry population or the vaccine was
antigenically less similar to the field viruses, the A(H5N1) viruses
were able to breakthrough vaccinated population and result in addi-
tional outbreaks.131 In the latter scenario, A(H5N1) infected birds
with no disease signs had been sent to market, resulting in infection
and propagation of the virus within the market environment raising
the risk of human infection. In 2017, after the emergence of the
HPAI A(H7N9) variants, China added an H7 antigen to the existing
monovalent H5 vaccines used in poultry. The bivalent H5/H7 vac-
cine was introduced in Guangdong and Guangxi provinces in July
2017, followed by introduction into other regions by the winter of
2017-2018. The number of reported human A(H7N9) cases were
reduced by 92% after the enhanced poultry vaccination campaign,
and only one human H7N9 infection has been reported to WHO
since 2019 to the present.132 However, some countries lack the
financial and human resources for a comprehensive stamping-out
program.
Last, although different exposures to infected poultry may have
contributed to human infections with the specific subtype A(H5N6), it
is also possible that biological features of A(H5N6) viruses also con-
tributed to occurrence of human infections. In a study conducted by
Chen et al., an A(H5N1) reassortant virus with several amino acid sub-
stitutions in HA and the NA gene of a human seasonal A(H3N2) virus
(A/Brisbane/10/2007) was transmitted via respiratory droplets
between ferrets, but an A(H5N1) reassortant virus with the same HA
gene and the NA gene of a human seasonal A(H1N1) virus
(A/Brisbane/59/2007) was not transmitted.128 Additional studies,
including gain-of-function (GOF) research, are instrumental to better
elucidate the potential mechanism that allows some viruses to cross
species barriers.
The importance of continued monitoring of the ecology and
ongoing evolution of potentially zoonotic avian influenza viruses
should not be underestimated. Some of the fundamental and impor-
tant activities such as surveillance programs in diverse animal reser-
voirs, including wildlife, are not always a high priority and properly
funded. Several studies on poultry outbreaks caused by clade 2.3.4.4
A(H5) viruses in the United States and the Netherlands suggested that
the viruses were introduced from wild birds rather than farm-to-farm
transmissions.29,133 In a review, Morin et al. has warned that acceler-
ated warming of the Arctic by climate change has the potential to
affect migratory patterns, the timing of biological events, and habitats
of migratory birds, resulting in the potential to impact virus transmis-
sion dynamics among avian species.134 The surveillance activities
should incorporate a component of how environmental changes may
affect influenza virus hosts and the distribution and genomic constel-
lations of influenza A viruses.
8 | CONCLUSION
Because their emergence, the clade 2.3.4.4 HPAI A(H5) viruses
have evolved through point mutations and reassortment with cir-
culating local viruses following global expansion via distinct path-
ways. So far, these viruses have caused only sporadic human
infections and are unable to transmit efficiently among humans.
Studies have shown that some clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses have
dual-receptor specificity and can transmit between ferrets in
direct contact. Furthermore, some A(H5N6) viruses isolated from
humans have molecular signatures related to mammalian
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adaptation. It is uncertain what other changes are necessary for
these viruses to become transmissible among humans. Their wide-
spread distribution, ongoing evolution, and periodic infection of
mammalian hosts increase the chances that efficient transmissibil-
ity is possible to be acquired. This calls for surveillance of influ-
enza viruses in domestic and wild birds to be enhanced to allow
for timely development and updating of veterinary and public
health countermeasures and to reduce the threats of zoonotic
and pandemic influenza.
9 | GENOMIC ANALYSIS
HA genetic sequence data (GSD) of HPAI viruses isolated from ani-
mals, including mammals and avian species, that possessed multi-
basic amino acids at the HA cleavage site between 2013 and
February 2019 and available in the EpiFlu database of Global Initia-
tive on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID) were analyzed. Between
2013 and February 2019, 2553 A(H5) HPAI viruses were available.
The open reading frame of the HA genes of A(H5) viruses was used
for phylogenetic analysis. Multiple sequence alignment of H5
viruses was performed using BioEdit 7.2. A maximum-likelihood
tree was constructed for MEGA 7 with 1000 replicates. The
242 virus GSDs were used as the reference for the nomenclature
of A(H5) HA systematized by World Health Organization/World
Organization for Animal Health/Food and Agriculture Organization
(WHO/OIE/FAO) H5 Evolution Working Group.135 The phyloge-
netic tree is available upon request. Among the 2553 H5 viruses,
1994 H5 viruses, which belonged to clade 2.3.4.4, were used fur-
ther analysis.
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